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This study examines the relation between jet fuel hedging and firm value using a sample of 36 
publicly-traded U.S. airlines over the period 1992 to 2013. We find a positive hedging premium 
which suggests that jet fuel hedging adds value to airlines. We then focus our analyses on the 
specific ways in which jet fuel hedging by airlines can affect firm value. Specifically, we investigate 
the effect of jet fuel hedging on firm value based on different hedging levels, different levels of jet 
fuel exposures, different hedger types, different operating costs spent on jet fuel, and different 
levels of jet fuel price volatility. Our results suggest that airlines can maximize their firm value by 
increasing the hedged proportion of next year's jet fuel requirements hedged, particularly when 
they are at a medium level (between 11% and 36%). Next, we find evidence which suggests that 
selective hedging strategies can help increase an airline’s firm value. In addition, our results suggest 
that airlines can increase their firm value significantly by increasing the amount of jet fuel hedged 
if the amount of their operating costs spent on jet fuel is high (> 27%). Fourthly, our results show 
that investors appear to value jet fuel hedging more in periods of high jet fuel price volatility. For 
different levels of jet fuel exposures, we find no evidence that the effect of jet fuel hedging on firm 












I would like to express my sincerely thanks to my supervisor, Dr. Thomas Walker, for his great 
support of my master study. Without his incredible patience, guidance, and encouragement 
throughout this research, I could not conquer the difficulties and finish this thesis. It has been my 
great honor to study and research with him. 
Also, I would like to express my thanks to my parents. They give me great support during my study 
and my entire life. 
Last but not the least, I would like to thank all of my friends. They provided me with assistance, 
















1. Introduction ................................................................................................................................................... 1 
2. Literature review ........................................................................................................................................... 3 
2.1 Hedging and firm value ........................................................................................................................... 3 
2.2 Jet fuel hedging in the airline industry .................................................................................................... 5 
3. Data ............................................................................................................................................................... 6 
4. Methodology ................................................................................................................................................. 7 
4.1 The relation between hedging and firm value of airlines ........................................................................ 8 
4.1.1 Measuring an airline’s jet fuel exposure ....................................................................................... 8 
4.1.2 Determinants of jet fuel hedging by airlines .............................................................................. 10 
4.1.3 Firm value and hedging .............................................................................................................. 13 
4.2 How does hedging affect firm value of airlines specifically ................................................................. 15 
4.2.1 The effect of change in hedging on change in firm value at different hedging levels ................ 15 
4.2.2 The effect of hedging and exposure on firm value ..................................................................... 17 
4.2.3 The effect of hedging on firm value for different hedger types .................................................. 18 
4.2.4 The effect of hedging on firm value at different levels of the average percentage of operating 
costs spent on jet fuel .......................................................................................................................... 19 
4.2.5 The effect of hedging on firm value at different levels of jet fuel price volatility ...................... 20 
5. Result analysis ............................................................................................................................................. 21 
5.1 Results of the relation between jet fuel hedging and firm value of airlines .......................................... 21 
5.1.1 Analysis of airline jet fuel exposures .......................................................................................... 21 
5.1.2 Analysis of the determinants of jet fuel hedging by airlines ...................................................... 24 
5.1.3 Analysis of the effect of hedging on firm value ......................................................................... 26 
5.2 Results of how hedging affect firm value of airlines specifically ......................................................... 28 
5.2.1 Analysis of the effect of jet fuel hedging on firm value at different hedging levels ................... 28 
5.2.2 Analysis of the effect of hedging and exposure on firm value ................................................... 29 
5.2.3 Analysis of the effect of hedging on firm value for different hedger types ................................ 30 
  
5.2.4 Analysis of the effect of hedging on firm value at different levels of the average percentage of 
operating costs spent on jet fuel .......................................................................................................... 31 
5.2.5 Analysis of the effect of hedging on firm value at different levels of jet fuel price volatility .... 32 
6. Conclusion ................................................................................................................................................... 33 
Reference ............................................................................................................................................................ 36 


















The relation between a firm’s hedging behavior and its firm value has been a focus of many studies 
in corporate finance. For example, Allayannis and Weston (2001) examine the relation between 
firm’s hedging activities using foreign currency derivatives and firm value using Tobin’s Q as a 
proxy. They find a significant and positive relation between foreign currency hedging and firm 
value. Yet, very little research focuses on the question in what specific ways a firm’s hedging 
behaviors affect firm value. Many researchers conclude that hedging is associated with higher firm 
value, but most of them do not examine if firm value can be increased “magically” by increasing 
the amount of hedging. Similarly, some research studies investigate whether firms’ operating or 
financial exposures are affected by hedging, but few of them examine if the impact of hedging on 
firm value appears to vary with the operating or financial exposures.  
In our study, we use a sample of 36 publicly-traded U.S. airlines during the period from 1992 to 
2013 to investigate the relation between jet fuel hedging and firm value and, more importantly, 
how jet fuel hedging behaviors by airlines affect firm value specifically. We choose the U.S. airline 
industry because it offers an excellent environment for studying hedging behaviors. Firstly, 
publicly-traded U.S. airlines typically report the percentage of next year's fuel requirements hedged, 
which can be used as a hedging proxy, in their 10-K reports. This provides an easy and reliable 
way of getting hedging proxy data. Secondly, jet fuel is an important input commodity for the 
operating process of airlines. In our sample, the average percentage of operating costs that are spent 
on jet fuel is about 20%. Since jet fuel is an input commodity for airlines rather than a product of 
the firm such as oil & gas and gold, it creates a risk based on the costs rather than the revenue of 
the airlines. Thirdly, jet fuel prices are much more volatile than many other commodity prices such 
as foreign currencies and gold.  
In our research, we first calculate the jet fuel price exposure of airlines and analyze the 
characteristics of the airlines’ jet fuel price exposure before we investigate the impact of the airlines’ 
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jet fuel hedging behaviors and how the effects of airlines’ jet fuel hedging activities on firm value 
are different based on the jet fuel price exposures. Our results suggest that the jet fuel exposures of 
airlines are positively correlated with the jet fuel price and the rising direction of the jet fuel price 
and negatively correlated with the volatility of jet fuel prices. 
Next, we investigate the relation between the hedging activities and firm value of airlines to check 
if hedging can add value to firms. We find evidence supporting our hypothesis that hedging 
activities can add firm value to airlines. We find that the natural log of Tobin's Q for airlines using 
jet fuel derivatives for hedging is 26.41% greater than that for airlines which do not use jet fuel 
hedging derivatives. Our results suggest that a 1% increase in the hedging of next year's fuel 
requirement appears to increase the natural log of Tobin's Q by about 0.21%. 
In the last and most important part of our study, we explore in what specific ways hedging affects 
the firm value of airlines. Moreover, we investigate the effect of jet fuel hedging on the firm value 
of airlines based on different hedging levels and different jet fuel exposure levels. We also analyze 
the effect of different types of hedgers’ jet fuel hedging behavior on firm value and explore how 
the relative size of jet fuel costs to total operating costs can affect the hedging behavior by airlines. 
Finally, we examine if the effect of hedging on firm value varies based on different levels of jet 
fuel price volatility. Our research aims to provide guidelines to airlines when and to what extent 
they should use jet fuel hedging derivatives. Based on our results, when the percent of next year's 
jet fuel requirements hedged is in a medium range (11% < PerHedg <= 36%), airlines experience 
the greatest and most significant increase in firm value which means that firm value cannot be 
increased sustainably simply by increasing the amount of hedging. We find no significant joint 
effect of jet fuel hedging and fuel price exposure on firm value which suggests that investors do 
not value hedging more because of a higher jet fuel price exposure. We find evidence that selective 
hedging by airlines can help increase firm value significantly. We explore how different levels of 
operating costs spent on jet fuel affect a firm’s hedging and find that when the level is above 27%, 
hedging helps increase the firm value. Our research also presents evidence that airlines can increase 
firm value by increasing the percentage of next year's fuel requirement hedged in periods of volatile 
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jet fuel prices. However, during periods of low jet fuel price volatility, an increase in jet fuel 
hedging has no significant effect on the firm value of airlines.  
 
2. Literature review 
2.1 Hedging and firm value 
There are many previous studies that investigate firm’s hedging behavior, firm performance, and 
firm value, but the results from these studies are mixed.  
Allayannis and Weston (2001) examine the impact of the use of foreign currency derivatives on 
firm value using a sample of 720 large U.S. nonfinancial firms during the period from 1990 to 1995. 
They use Tobin’s Q as a proxy for firm value and find that firms using foreign currency derivatives 
to hedge their currency risk are valued significantly higher (4.87%) than firms that do not use 
foreign currency derivatives. Thus, their findings are consistent with the theory that hedging 
increase firm value.  
Kim et al. (2004) investigate the interrelationship between operational and financial hedging 
activities and the effects of firms’ hedging strategies on foreign exchange risk exposure and firm 
value using a sample of 212 non-operationally hedged firms and 212 operationally hedged firms 
that are matched based on size and industry. In their study, they regress the natural log of Tobin's 
Q against the financial derivatives user proxy and operational hedging proxy. They find that both 
operational and financial hedging strategies can reduce foreign exchange risk exposure and 
enhance firm value significantly. 
Lookman (2004) investigates whether hedging activities can increase firm value by examining 
whether the hedging premium is larger for firms that hedge a primary versus a secondary risk. In 
his research, he regresses firm value against the hedging proxies for primary and secondary risk 
hedged using a sample of oil and gas producing firms. He finds that hedging is associated with 
lower firm value for undiversified E&P firms where commodity price risk is a primary risk while 
 4 
 
hedging is associated with higher firm value for diversified firms with an E&P segment. Taken 
together, these results are not consistent with the hypothesis that hedging can increase firm value. 
Callahan (2002) investigate if the hedging behaviors of 20 firms in the North American gold mining 
industry lead to sustainable benefits for the firms’ shareholders. In their study, they regress the 
volatility of the stock price against the hedging factor to check the relation between hedging and 
stock price performance. They find that hedging activities can significantly reduce the stock price 
volatility of gold mining firms which indicates that shareholders can benefit from firm’s hedging 
behavior. 
Smithson and Simkins (2005) examine if risk management can increase firm value using a survey 
method. In their research, they investigate the relation between financial price risk and share price 
behavior, the relation between the use of derivatives and reduced risk, the relation between cash 
flow volatility and firm value, and the relation between the use of risk management and the value 
of the firm. They argue that although there is some evidence that risk management increases the 
value of the firm, the evidence is fairly limited. They also question in which ways the use of 
derivatives might be adding firm value and the effect of active risk management and recommend 
further research on the topic. 
Nelson et al. (2005) investigate the impact of hedging on the market value of equity using a sample 
of approximately 5,700 U.S. firms over the period from 1995 to 1999. They find consistent 
evidence that firms that hedge outperform firms that do not hedge by 4.3% per year on average. 
However, the better stock market performance of firms that use derivatives is limited to companies 
that hedge foreign currency risk. There are no abnormal returns for firms using interest rate 
derivatives and commodity price derivatives. In their research, they also compare the relative 
valuation of hedging firms and firms that do not hedge. They find that large firms that use currency 
hedgers have higher relative valuations than non-hedge firms, a result that is consistent with 
Allayannis and Weston (2001). However, for smaller currency hedgers and other types of hedgers, 
they find lower relative valuations. 
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Jin and Jorion (2006) investigate the relation between hedging and firm value according to the 
hedging activities of 119 U.S. oil and gas producers during the sample period from 1998 to 2001. 
In their research, they examine the effect of a firm’s hedging behavior on its stock return sensitivity 
to oil and gas prices and find that oil and gas hedging can help reduce the sensitivity of a firm’s 
stock return to oil and gas prices. In addition, they investigate the effect of hedging on firm value. 
However, they find no significant difference between the firm value of hedgers and that of non-
hedgers.  
Bartram et al. (2011) examine the effect of the derivative use on firm risk and value using a large 
sample of 6,888 nonfinancial firms from 47 countries including the United States. In their study, 
they find that firms that use derivatives appear to have lower cash flow volatility, idiosyncratic 
volatility, and systematic risk than firms that do not use derivatives, which suggests that 
nonfinancial firms use derivatives to reduce their risk. Their results also demonstrate that derivative 
users appear to have significantly higher value, abnormal returns, and larger profits than firms that 
do not use derivatives. 
 
2.2 Jet fuel hedging in the airline industry 
There are several prior studies which focus on the jet fuel hedging behaviors in the airline industry, 
For instance, Rao (1999) investigates whether hedging fuel price risk using heating oil futures 
contracts can reduce the volatility of an airline’s pretax income effectively based on a sample of 10 
large U.S. airlines over the period from 1988 to 1997. He finds that jet fuel hedging can reduce the 
unexplained volatility of the average airline’s quarterly income by over 23% after controlling for 
trend, seasonality, and persistence of shocks, which suggests that the usefulness of jet fuel hedging 
is not restricted to protecting weak airlines that cannot withstand an increase in fuel prices.  
Carter et al. (2006) investigate the impact of jet fuel hedging behavior on firm value using a sample 
of U.S. airlines during the period from 1992 to 2003. In their research, they regress firm value 
against the hedging proxy and find that airlines’ jet fuel hedging behaviors are significantly and 
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positively related to firm value. They find that the hedging premium of their sample airlines is as 
large as 10%. They also examine if the hedging premium is related to investment opportunities and 
find that the positive relation between hedging and value increases with the ratio of capital 
expenditures to sales, which suggests that investors tend to value hedging behaviors more as they 
expect these hedging activities to protect their ability to invest during bad times. 
Sturm (2009) examines if selective hedging strategies according to the price behavior of jet fuel 
spot, crude oil spot, and crude oil futures can increase the firm value of airlines. In his research, he 
applies an event-study methodology to test for abnormal price behavior using monthly spot price 
data obtained from the U.S. Department of Energy during the period from March 1990 to December 
2005. He finds that jet fuel prices show a strong seasonal tendency during the second half of the 
calendar year. Moreover, he estimates the potential value to the airline industry and finds that 
airlines can add value by selectively cross-hedging their exposure to jet fuel prices in the crude oil 
futures markets.  
Treanor et al. (2014) investigate the relation between jet fuel price exposures and the percentage of 
next year's fuel requirements hedged and how they affect on airline’s firm value using a sample of 
U.S. airlines in the period from 1994 to 2008. In their research, they regress the natural log of 
Tobin's Q against the percentage of next year's fuel requirements hedged and the product of the 
percentage of next year's fuel requirements hedged and the jet fuel exposure coefficient. They find 
that hedging can increase an airline’s firm value, but the hedging premium does not increase with 
the jet fuel price exposures of airlines. 
 
3. Data  
Our sample consists of 36 publicly-traded U.S. airline firms with SIC codes equal to 4512 or 4513 
(scheduled air transportation) during the period from 1992 to 2013. Firstly, we obtain a list of 45 
publicly-traded U.S. airlines from Compustat, but some of them have limited data during our 
 7 
 
sample period. After excluding airlines that have little useful data for our analyses such as PAN 
AM CORP, which only has data for 1996 in Compustat, we have 36 publicly-traded U.S. airlines 
for the analyses in our paper.  
To estimate the jet fuel price exposure for each airlines in the first part of our analyses, we retrieve 
daily returns for each airline and equally-weighted market returns from the Center for Research in 
Stock Prices (CRSP) and then calculate jet fuel returns using U.S. Gulf Coast spot jet fuel prices 
which we obtain from the Department of Energy Information Administration's website 
(http://www.eia.doe.gov/).  
We collect financial data such as the book value of total assets, long-term debt, and capital 
expenditures for each airline from Compustat. We will review these variables in more detail in 
Section 4.1.2.  
To proxy for jet fuel hedging, we collect the percentage of next year's jet fuel requirements hedged 
from the 10-K reports for each airline. This variable is important and widely used in studies that 
explore jet fuel hedging behaviors in the airline industry. Another variable that is also collected 
from 10-K reports is the percentage of operating costs that are spent on jet fuel. This variable 
appears in some previous research such as Carter et al. (2006), but they only provide summary 
statistics for it and do not use it in the core part of analyses. In our research, we specifically use 
this variable. 
 
4. Methodology  
In this paper, we investigate the hedging activities and firm value of airlines. In the first part of our 
study, we examine the relation between hedging activities and firm value to confirm whether 
hedging can add value to airlines. In the second part, we explore in what specific ways hedging 
affects the firm value of airlines.   
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4.1 The relation between hedging and firm value of airlines 
In this section, we first investigate the jet fuel exposures of airlines because one of the most 
important objectives of hedging next year's jet fuel requirements by airlines is to reduce the 
exposure to jet fuel price risk. Afterwards, we test the determinants of jet fuel hedging to check 
which factors affect an airline’s hedging activities (e.g., whether airlines with more jet fuel 
exposure choose to hedge more of next year’s fuel requirements). Finally, we examine how jet fuel 
hedging affects airlines’ firm value directly.  
 
4.1.1 Measuring an airline’s jet fuel exposure 
The first step of our analysis is to measure each airline’s exposure to jet fuel over time. First, we 
employ standard methodology to estimate the risk exposure of jet fuel prices following some 
previous studies (e.g., Jorion (1990), Bartov and Bodnar (1994), Petersen and Thiagarajan (2000), 
and Carter et al. (2006)). Specifically, we regress the daily returns for each airline on the equally-
weighted market returns and jet fuel returns in a two-factor market model as shown in Eq. (1) 
below: 
Ri,t = αi+βi,q*Rmkt,t+γi,q*RJet Fuel,t+εi,t ,                                              (1) 
where Ri,t is the daily stock price return of of airline i on day t as gathered from CRSP, Rmkt,t is the 
CRSP equally-weighted market portfolio return for day t, RJet Fuel,t is the daily return on the Gulf 
Coast spot jet fuel prices for day t, and εi,t is the residual for airline i and day t. For each firm, the 
estimated coefficient, γ, is a measure of the airline’s jet fuel exposure. When aggregating the 
coefficients by quarter, there are 1,599 quarterly estimated jet fuel exposure coefficients after 
excluding firm-quarter observations for which stock price data is missing in our sample. Because 
higher jet fuel prices tend to increase the operating costs of airlines and thus lead to lower returns 
of airlines, we expect airlines to be negatively exposed to the price of jet fuel. 
Treanor et al. (2014) argue that the reaction of airlines’ stock prices to variations in jet fuel prices 
likely affects a firm's hedging policy and potentially the hedging premium. In this paper, we 
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estimate a series of models to investigate the stability of an airline’s jet fuel exposure coefficients 
in various regimes following their methodology. The models are as follows:   
R𝑖,𝑡=αi+ βiRmkt,t + ∑ γjR
Jet Fuel,  j, t
n
j=1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                           (2) 
where Ri,t is the daily stock price return for airline i on day t, Rmkt,t is the CRSP equally-weighted 
market portfolio return for day t, RJet Fuel,j,t is the daily return on the Gulf Coast spot jet fuel prices 
for day t during regime j, βm is the market risk factor which indicates the market risk exposure, γj 
is the jet fuel risk factor for regime j which indicates the jet fuel risk exposure, and εi,t is the residual 
for airline i and day t.  
We follow Treanor et al. (2014) and employ three different regimes to investigate the stability of 
airlines' jet fuel exposure coefficients. The first regime is based on the price level of jet fuel. 
Specifically, we regress the returns of airlines against the returns of jet fuel prices during different 
fuel price levels to estimate airline exposure coefficients based on differing fuel price levels: 
Ri,t = α0 + β1Rmkt,t +γ1Jet Fueli(l) + γ2Jet Fueli(m) + γ3Jet Fueli(h) + ei,t                      (3) 
where Jet Fueli
(l) is the daily return of the jet fuel price when the jet fuel price is below the 25th 
percentile, otherwise zero. Jet Fueli
(m) is the daily return of the jet fuel price when the jet fuel price 
is between the 25th and 75th percentiles, otherwise zero. Jet Fueli
(h) is the daily return of the jet fuel 
price when the jet fuel price is above the 75th percentile, otherwise zero. 
The second regime we investigate is based on the general direction of jet fuel prices. Specifically, 
we examine whether there is any difference between an airline’s exposure to fuel prices in rising 
and falling fuel price periods. We thus regress the returns of airlines against the returns of jet fuel 
prices during periods of rising and falling fuel prices. The model is as follows: 
Ri,t = α0 + β1Rmkt,t +γ1Jet Fueli(r) + γ2Jet Fueli(f) + ei,t                                  (4) 
where Jet Fuel(r) is the daily jet fuel return in fuel prices during quarters when the average daily 
return of jet fuel prices is positive, otherwise zero; Jet Fuel(f) is the daily jet fuel return during 
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quarters when the average daily return of jet fuel prices is negative, otherwise zero. 
In addition, we conduct a test based on the volatility of jet fuel prices. Treanor et al. (2014) find no 
significant difference between the exposure coefficients during periods of volatile jet fuel prices 
and those in periods of stable jet fuel prices. However, in some previous studies that explored the 
relationship between the exposure coefficients and price volatility, researchers found that the 
exposure coefficient is negatively related to the price volatility (e.g., Brennan and Schwartz (1995) 
and Hong and Sarkar (2008)).  In our research, we use the following model to test the relation 
between the exposure coefficients and price volatility: 
Ri,t = α0 + β1Rmkt,t +γ1Jet Fuel Voli
(l) + γ2Jet Fuel Voli
(m) + γ3Jet Fuel Voli
(h) + ei,t                               (5) 
where Jet Fuel Voli
(l) is the daily return of the jet fuel price when the standard deviation of the jet 
fuel price is in the first quartile, otherwise zero. Jet Fuel Voli
(m) is the daily return of jet fuel price 
when the standard deviation of the jet fuel price is in the second and third quartiles, otherwise zero. 
Jet Fuel Voli
(h) is the daily return of the jet fuel price when the standard deviation of the jet fuel 
price is in the fourth quartile, otherwise zero.  
 
4.1.2 Determinants of jet fuel hedging by airlines 
In this section, we analyze which factor affect an airline’s jet fuel hedging. There are several 
theories in corporate risk management that can be used to explain hedging. The first theory states 
that hedging activities can reduce a firm’s expected financial distress costs and lead to higher firm 
value. The second theory argues that hedging can help reduce corporate income taxes. The third 
theory suggests that risk aversion leads managers to carry out hedging activities to reduce firm risk. 
Before testing the effect of airlines’ hedging activities on firm value, we first take a look at the 
effect of different kinds of factors on airlines’ hedging activities.  
To investigate whether airlines modify their hedging activities in response to their exposure to fuel 
prices, corporate income taxes, or financial constraints, we propose the following function. 
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PerHedgi,y = f (Exposure proxies, Tax proxy, Financial constraint proxies)                (6) 
Because the dependent variable (PerHedgi,y) equals to zero for non-hedgers and is greater than zero 
but less than or equal to one for hedgers, we use a Tobit model instead of a linear regression model 
to estimate the function. In the model, PerHedgi,y is the percentage of next year's jet fuel 
requirements hedged by airline i in year y; Exposure proxies include the airline's jet fuel exposure 
coefficient (Exposure), the price of jet fuel (Price_JetFuel), the annual percentage change in fuel 
prices (Year_Change_JetFuel), and the daily standard deviation of jet fuel returns (Stdev_JetFuel). 
We use the ratio of tax loss carryforwards to total assets (TaxTA) to proxy for a firm’s tax burden 
following Carter et al. (2006).   
We also follow Carter et al. (2006) when defining our financial constraints proxies. First, we 
include the ratio of capital expenditures to sales (CAPTSAL) and the natural log of Tobin's Q (LnQ) 
as explanatory variables to control for investment opportunities. Froot et al. (1993) and Geczy et 
al. (1997) argue that a firm’s hedging activities tend to be positively correlated with its investment 
opportunities. Firms are hypothesized to hedge more with higher CAPTSAL or higher Tobin's Q, 
i.e. higher levels of investment and higher values placed on future investment. Carter et al. (2006) 
show a positive but insignificant relation between capital expenditures and hedging while Treanor 
et al. (2014) observe a positive and significant relation between them. In this study, we estimate 
Tobin's Q using the simple approximation approach proposed by Chung and Pruitt (1994) (note 
that the same approach is used by Carter et al, 2006). Treanor et al. (2014) report that hedging is 
positively affected by LnQ, but the effect of LnQ is insignificant. On the other hand, Carter et al. 
(2006) show a positive and significant effect of Tobin’s Q on hedging. 
Then, we include the long-term debt to total assets ratio (LTDTA) and the natural logarithm of the 
book value of total assets (LnTass) to control for expected financial distress cost arguments for 
hedging. Since most researchers suggest that the hypothesized relation between expected financial 
distress costs and hedging is positive, the standard expectation in a hedging regression is a positive 
coefficient on LTDTA and a negative coefficient on LnTass. For the long-term debt to total assets 
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ratio (LTDTA), an indicator of leverage, Haushalter (2000) and Graham and Rogers (2002) find 
that firms with a higher level of debt in their capital structure, and hence, a higher probability of 
financial distress tend to hedge more. However, in several prior studies, the researchers find the 
relation between expected financial distress costs and hedging is opposite of these predictions. For 
the natural logarithm of the book value of total assets (LnTass), an indicator of firm size, Nance et 
al. (1993), Mian (1996), and Géczy et al. (1997) have found that large firms are more likely to use 
derivatives due to the high start-up costs necessary to develop a hedging program. Carter et al. 
(2006) report a negative relation between debt and hedging and a positive relation between firm 
size and hedging. They suggest that firms in the airline industry facing greater distress costs if 
distress is incurred will choose lower debt ratios. Treanor et al. (2014) also find a negative relation 
between debt and hedging and a positive relation between firm size and hedging, and both of them 
are significant relations. 
Next, we control for the proxies of cash. The ratio of cash flow to sales (Cash Flow) and the ratio 
of cash holdings to sales (Cash) are the two proxies we used in our research. According to Myers 
and Majluf (1984), cash can provide a financial buffer for firms that view internal financing as less 
costly than external financing. Thus firms that generate or hold greater cash flow are less likely to 
face binding constraints in financing investment, and these two cash proxies are included as inverse 
proxies for financial constraints. Carter et al. (2006) find a negative but insignificant effect of Cash 
and a positive effect of Cash Flow on hedging. However, in the research of Treanor et al. (2014), 
they show a negative but insignificant relation between Cash Flow and hedging, and the 
relationship between Cash and hedging is positive but insignificant when using Exposure as the 
proxy for jet fuel price risk.  
Since the effect of bankruptcy is also an important financial constraint, we also include the S&P 
credit ratings from Compustat (S&P Credit) and Altman’s Z-score. In Compustat, S&P is 
numerically scaled from 2 to 27, and lower numbers reflect higher credit ratings. For the airlines 
which have no credit rating, we code them with a value of 30 for this variable as in Carter et al. 
(2006) and Treanor et al. (2014). Altman’s Z-score is calculated as introduced in Altman (1968). 
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Both Carter et al. (2006) and Treanor et al. (2014) find a negative and significant relation between 
credit ratings and hedging. In the research of Carter et al. (2006), they find no statistically 
significant relation between Z-score and jet fuel hedging.  
Next, we include some variables which are indicators of alternative hedging activities. Fuel pass-
through indicator (Fuel_Pass) is a dummy variable which equals to one for firms that a fuel pass-
through agreement is reported in the company's 10-K filing, otherwise zero. When a fuel pass 
through arrangement occurs, one airline is essentially flying aircraft on behalf of another party and 
fuel costs are simply passed along by the airline operating the aircraft. According to Carter et al. 
(2006) and Treanor et al. (2014), a fuel pass-through agreement provides an alternative risk 
management strategy for fuel price risk, so we assume a negative relation between PerHedg and 
Fuel_Pass. Charter indicator (Charter) is a dummy variable which equals to one when firms 
disclose that chartering is a significant part of their businesses, otherwise zero. The foreign 
currency derivative indicator (Foreign_Currency) and the interest rate derivative indicator 
(Interest_Rate) are the dummy variables for firms’ use of foreign currency derivative and interest 
rate derivative, respectively. Carter et al. (2006) find a negative and significant relation between 
Fuel_Pass and PerHedg as well as a positive and significant relation between the interest rate 
derivative indicator and PerHedg.  
Finally, we also include the dividend indicator (Dividend) and the ratio of advertising to sales 
(AdvTSales). These two variables show some explanations of the firm value in the next step of the 
analysis in both research of Carter et al. (2006) and Treanor et al. (2014). Since both of them can 
be viewed as expenses that reduce firms’ cash, we want to investigate whether they will affect firms’ 
hedging activities as we assume for the proxies of cash before. 
 
4.1.3 Firm value and hedging 
After the investigation of the determinants of jet fuel hedging activities by airlines, we then exam 
the effect of jet fuel hedging activities on firm value. We use Tobin's Q as our proxy for firm value, 
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and there are 407 firm-year observations for the 36 airline companies during the sample period 
from 1992 to 2013. We regress the natural logarithm of Tobin's Q against the jet fuel hedging 
indicators. At first, we estimate the relationship between firm value and the hedge dummy (Hedger). 
From this estimation, we want to check if there is a significant difference between hedgers and 
non-hedgers of jet fuel. The model is as following: 
LnQi,y = α + β1 ∗ Hedger + β2–16(Control Variablesi,y) + ei,y                                          (7) 
where LnQi,y is the natural logarithm of Tobin's Q for airline i in year y; Hedger is the hedge dummy 
which equals to one if firm hedge any portion of its next year’s jet fuel requirements, otherwise 
zero. The control variables are the same as we use in the estimation of Eq. (6). They include the 
ratio of capital expenditure to sales (CAPTSAL), the long-term debt to total assets ratio (LTDTA), 
the natural logarithm of the book value of total assets (LnTass), the ratio of cash flow to sales (Cash 
Flow), the ratio of cash holdings to sales (Cash), the S&P credit ratings from Compustat (S&P 
Credit), Altman’s Z-score, the fuel pass-through indicator (Fuel_Pass), charter indicator, foreign 
currency derivative indicator, interest rate derivative indicator, the dividend indicator (Dividend), 
the ratio of advertising to sales (AdvTSales) and the ratio of tax loss carryforwards to total assets 
(TaxTA). These control variables are used in many previous studies such as Allayannis and Weston 
(2001) and Carter et al. (2006). Moreover, we also include the average percentage of operating 
costs that are spent on jet fuel (JetfuelTOpeExp) to investigate if there is a significant relation 
between the operating costs spent on jet fuel and firm value. We expect a significant and positive 
coefficient of the hedger dummy according to the results of research by Carter et al. (2006). 
Next, we regress firm value against the percent of next year's jet fuel requirements hedged 
(PerHedg) to check the effect of the amount of jet fuel hedged on firm value. The model is as 
following: 
LnQi,y = α + β1 ∗ PerHedgi,y + β2–16(Control Variablesi,y) + ei,y                                      (8) 
where LnQi,y is the natural logarithm of Tobin's Q for airline i in year y; PerHedgi,y is the percentage 
of next year's jet fuel requirements hedged for airline i in year y; Control Variables is the other firm 
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control variables used in Eq. (6). Here, we also expect a significant and positive coefficient β1 of 
the percentage of next year's jet fuel requirements hedged (PerHedg) which indicate that jet fuel 
hedging will increase firm value of airlines according to the results of research by Carter et al. 
(2006). 
When analyzing the results of Eq. (6) and Eq. (9), we may face a question of causality whether 
firms with higher value tend to hedge more or hedging more of the jet fuel costs will increase firm 
value. Thus, we use an alternative method to avoid the problem of endogeneity as Carter et al. 
(2006) did in their research. We regress the change of firm value against the firm’s hedging 
percentage. This type of regression is less likely to suffer from a question of causality when we 
analyze the results of the estimation of Eq. (9). It will help us to confirm the effect of jet fuel 
hedging on firm value. The regression model is as following:  
∆LnQi,y = α + β1 ∗ ∆Hedgeri,y + β2–16(∆Control Variablesi,y) + ei,y                                (9) 
∆LnQi,y = α + β1 ∗ ∆PerHedgi,y + β2–16(∆Control Variablesi,y) + ei,y                              (10) 
where ∆LnQi,y is the change of the natural logarithm of Tobin's Q for airline i in year y; ∆Hedgeri,y 
is the first difference of the hedger dummy for airline i in year y; ∆PerHedgi,y is the first difference 
of the percentage of next year's jet fuel requirements hedged for airline i in year y; ∆Control 
Variables is the first difference of the other firm control variables used in Eq. (8). 
 
4.2 How does hedging affect firm value of airlines specifically 
After estimating the relation between the jet fuel hedging and firm value of airlines to investigate 
if hedging can add value to firms, we, then, explore in what specific ways jet fuel hedging affects 
firm value of airlines in this section. 
 
4.2.1 The effect of change in hedging on change in firm value at different hedging levels 
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There are many previous studies about the relation between hedging activities and firm value, but 
few of them focus on how the hedging activities affect the firm value of airlines specifically. In 
this paper, firstly, we investigate the effect that jet fuel hedging brings to the firm value of airlines 
in different hedging levels. Since we face a question about multicollinearity if we divide the percent 
of next year's jet fuel requirements hedged into different tertiles and then run a regression between 
them and the natural logarithm of Tobin's Q, we apply an alternative method using the first 
difference of the variables. This method can help us avoid the problem of multicollinearity and 
investigate the effect of hedging on firm value in different hedging levels. We divide the change in 
the percentage of next year's jet fuel requirements hedged into different tertiles and then regress 
the change in the natural logarithm of Tobin's Q against the change in the percentage of next year's 
jet fuel requirements hedged at different hedging levels. The model is as following: 
∆LnQi,y = α + β1 ∗ ∆PerHedg_l + β2 ∗∆PerHedg_m+ β3 ∗∆PerHedg_h +β4–17(∆Control 
Variablesi,y) + ei,y                                                                             (11) 
where ∆LnQi,y is the change in the natural logarithm of Tobin's Q for airline i in year y; ∆PerHedg_l 
is the change in percentage of next year's jet fuel requirements hedged (∆PerHedg) when the 
percentage of next year's jet fuel requirements hedged (PerHedg) is in the lower tertile, otherwise 
zero; ∆PerHedg_m is the change in percentage of next year's jet fuel requirements hedged 
(∆PerHedg) when the percentage of next year's jet fuel requirements hedged (PerHedg) is between 
the lower tertile and the upper tertile, otherwise zero; ∆PerHedg_h is the change in percentage of 
next year's jet fuel requirements hedged (∆PerHedg) when the percentage of next year's jet fuel 
requirements hedged (PerHedg)is in the upper tertile, otherwise zero; ∆Control Variables is the 
first difference of the other firm control variables used in Eq. (8). Since our null hypothesis is that 
jet fuel hedging can increase firm value, we expect a significant and positive coefficient β3 which 
should be larger than β2 as well as β1. These results indicate that higher level of jet fuel hedging 




4.2.2 The effect of hedging and exposure on firm value 
In the research of Treanor et al. (2014), they investigate the joint effect of jet fuel hedging and fuel 
price exposure using the product of the variables PerHedg and Exposure, and they find no 
significant joint effect of jet fuel hedging and fuel price exposure on the firm value of airlines. 
Since they are the first to regress the joint variable of jet fuel hedging and fuel price exposure 
against firm value, we use an alternative method in our research to check if their results about the 
joint effect of jet fuel hedging and fuel price exposure on firm value are reliable. We, firstly, classify 
the percentage of next year's jet fuel requirements hedged according to the different quartiles of 
exposure coefficient (Exposure). Then, we regress the natural logarithm of Tobin's Q (LnQ) against 
the percentage of next year's jet fuel requirements hedged at different jet fuel exposure levels. The 
model is as following: 
LnQi,y = α + β1 ∗ PerHedg_expL + β2 ∗ PerHedg_expM + β3∗ PerHedg_expH + β4–
17(Control Variablesi,y) + ei,y                                                                   (12) 
where LnQi,y is the natural logarithm of Tobin's Q for airline i in year y; PerHedg_expL is the 
percentage of the fuel requirements hedged when exposure coefficient is above the 75th quartile, 
otherwise zero. PerHedg_expM is the percentage of the fuel requirements hedged when exposure 
coefficient is between the 25th and 75th quartiles, otherwise zero. PerHedg_expH is the percentage 
of the fuel requirements hedged when exposure coefficient is below the 25th quartile, otherwise 
zero. The quartiles are determined over the period 1992–2013. The 25th and 75th quartiles are -
0.2561 and 0.0072, respectively. Control Variables is the other firm control variables used in Eq. 
(8). Since lower (more negative) exposure coefficient indicates higher fuel price exposure, and 
according to Treanor et al. (2014), they assume investors tend to value hedging more with higher 
jet fuel exposure, we expect the coefficient of the percentage of the fuel requirements hedged when 




4.2.3 The effect of hedging on firm value for different hedger types 
Adam and Fernando (2006) and Brown et al. (2006) investigate the gold mining firms and find that 
the economic gains from selective hedging appear to be small. Treanor et al. (2014) also explore 
the effect of selective hedging on firm value in the airline industry, they find that selective hedging 
strategies may do more harm than good to firm value. In their research, they use the standard 
deviation of the PerHedg variable alone as an indicator of hedger type, which do not reflect their 
definition of selective hedgers clearly in our opinion. According to their definition, selective 
hedgers are those firms whose standard deviation of the PerHedg variable is in the upper tertile, 
and passive hedgers are those firms whose standard deviation of the PerHedg variable is in the 
lower tertile. In our study, we apply an alternative method which we think will show us a more 
specific view of the effect of hedging on firm value in different hedger types. We combine the 
percentage of the fuel requirements hedged together with the firm’s hedger type, and investigate 
the joint effect of them to the firm value of airlines. The model is as following: 
LnQi,y = α + β1 ∗ PerHedg_P + β2 ∗ PerHedg_N + β3∗ PerHedg_S + β4–17 (Control Variablesi,y) 
+ ei,y                                                                                                (13) 
where LnQi,y is the natural logarithm of Tobin's Q for airline i in year y; PerHedg_P is the 
percentage of the fuel requirements hedged when the airline is classified as passive hedger as its 
standard deviation of the PerHedg variable is in the lower tertile, otherwise zero. PerHedg_N is 
the percentage of the fuel requirements hedged when the airline is classified as neutral hedger as 
its standard deviation of the PerHedg variable is between the lower tertile and the upper tertile, 
otherwise zero. PerHedg_S is the percentage of the fuel requirements hedged when the airline is 
classified as selective hedger as its standard deviation of the PerHedg variable is in the upper tertile, 
otherwise zero. Control Variables is the other firm control variables used in Eq. (8). Here, our null 
hypothesis is that selective hedging can help increase firm value, so we expect the coefficient of 
the percentage of the fuel requirements hedged when the airline is classified as selective hedger, 
β3, is significant and positive, and it should be larger than β1 and β2. 
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4.2.4 The effect of hedging on firm value at different levels of the average percentage of 
operating costs spent on jet fuel  
In the first part of our research, we add the ratio of jet fuel costs over the total operating costs 
(JetfuelTOpeExp) in our regression to check if the portion of jet fuel costs in the firm’s overall 
capital structure will affect the firm value of airlines. In this sector, we want to investigate if the 
effect of the percentage of the fuel requirements hedged on firm value will show any differences 
based on the level of the operating costs spent on jet fuel. Thus, we classify the percentage of next 
year's jet fuel requirements hedged based on the different levels of the average percentage of 
operating costs spent on jet fuel. The model is as following: 
LnQi,y = α + β1 ∗ PerHedg_jetL + β2 ∗ PerHedg_jetM + β3∗ PerHedg_jetH +  
       β4–17 (Control Variablesi,y) + ei,y                                                               (14) 
where LnQi,y is the natural logarithm of Tobin's Q for airline i in year y; PerHedg_jetL is the 
percentage of the fuel requirements hedged when the average percentage of operating costs spent 
on jet fuel is below the 25th quartile, otherwise zero. PerHedg_jetM is the percentage of the fuel 
requirements hedged when the average percentage of operating costs spent on jet fuel is between 
the 25th and 75th quartiles, otherwise zero. PerHedg_jetH is the percentage of the fuel requirements 
hedged when the average percentage of operating costs spent on jet fuel is above the 75th quartile, 
otherwise zero. The quartiles are determined over the period 1992–2013. The 25th and 75th quartiles 
are 0.126 and 0.270, respectively. Control Variables is the other firm control variables used in Eq. 
(8). Since we assume larger portion of jet fuel costs in the firm’s overall capital structure, which 
means jet fuel expense is a more important part of the firm’s overall business, will help increase 
the firm value of airlines, we expect a significant and positive coefficient of the percentage of the 
fuel requirements hedged when the average percentage of operating costs spent on jet fuel is above 





4.2.5 The effect of hedging on firm value at different levels of jet fuel price volatility 
Then, we investigate if hedging in periods of different levels of jet fuel price volatility will affect 
firm value differently. We include a year dummy for periods of high jet fuel price volatility 
(HighVol) which equals to one when the jet fuel price volatility is high during the year, otherwise 
zero. And we also include a year dummy for periods of low jet fuel price volatility (LowVol) which 
equals to one when the jet fuel price volatility is low during the year, otherwise zero. For the 
definition of the periods of high jet fuel price volatility and low jet fuel price volatility, we calculate 
the yearly standard deviation of the daily jet fuel price. We define years with yearly standard 
deviation greater than the mean yearly standard deviation of the daily jet fuel price over the sample 
periods (0.1628) as the periods of high jet fuel price volatility which include years from 2004 to 
2009, 2011 and 2012. The rest years are defined as the periods of low jet fuel price volatility.  
(Insert Figure 1 here) 
(Insert Figure 2 here) 
Since the jet fuel prices are high in the periods of high jet fuel price volatility which we can see 
from Figure 1, and higher jet fuel prices mean higher costs for airlines and will lead to lower firm 
value. The lower firm value can be confirmed by the average yearly Tobin’s Q of airlines shown in 
Figure 2. If we regress firm value against the percentage of the fuel requirements hedged in periods 
of different levels of jet fuel price volatility, we will face a problem that firm values are always 
lower during the periods of high jet fuel price volatility, and this result will affect our analysis of 
the impact of hedging on firm value in periods of different levels of jet fuel price volatility. To 
avoid the problem brought by the initial relation between the firm value and level of jet fuel price 
volatility, we use an alternative method in which we regress the change in the natural logarithm of 
Tobin's Q against the change in the percentage of the fuel requirement hedged at different levels of 
jet fuel price volatility instead. The model is as following: 
∆LnQi,y = α + β1 ∗ ∆PerHedgXLowVol + β2 ∗ ∆PerHedgXHighVol +  
         β3–16(∆ControlVariablesi,y) + ei,y                                       (15)   
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where ∆LnQi,y is the change in the natural logarithm of Tobin's Q for airline i in year y; 
∆PerHedgXLowVol is the change in the product of the percentage of next year's jet fuel 
requirements hedged and the year dummy for periods of low jet fuel price volatility (LowVol); 
∆PerHedgXHighVol is the change in percentage of next year's jet fuel requirements hedged 
(∆PerHedg) multiplied by the year dummy for periods of high jet fuel price volatility (HighVol). 
∆Control Variables is the first difference of the other firm control variables used in Eq. (8). Since 
we assume hedging can help airlines improve their firm value more in periods of high level of jet 
fuel price volatility, we expect a significant and positive coefficient for the product of ∆PerHedg 
and HighVol, β3. 
 
5. Result analysis 
5.1 Results of the relation between jet fuel hedging and firm value of airlines 
 
5.1.1 Analysis of airline jet fuel exposures 
(Insert Table 1 here) 
To capture the airlines’ jet fuel exposures, as we introduce in Section 4.1.1, we estimate a two-
factor market model on a quarterly basis using daily returns for each airline and the equally-
weighted market returns. Table 1 presents the descriptive results for the coefficients of the airlines’ 
jet fuel exposures in Eq. (1). It shows the mean, median, standard deviation, minimum, maximum, 
the percentage of negative values, the percentage of jet fuel exposure coefficients that are 
significant at the 10% level for each airline in our sample and also the proportion of years in which 
each airline reported hedging of jet fuel. From the result shown in Table 1, we can find that 31 out 
of the 36 airlines have negative mean jet fuel exposure coefficients in our sample. This result is 
consistent with our null hypothesis that higher jet fuel prices will lead to lower returns of airlines. 
In our sample, 13 out of the 36 airlines do not hedge any of their next year's jet fuel requirements 
using jet fuel derivatives which we definite as non-hedgers. Moreover, we find no clear patterns 
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except perhaps that non-hedgers typically exhibit lower exposure. The average coefficient for jet 
fuel exposures of non-hedgers is -0.042 while the average coefficient for jet fuel exposures of 
hedgers is -0.173.  
In the total sample, there are 1,615 quarterly estimated coefficients of the airlines’ jet fuel exposures. 
The average coefficient is −0.1461, and 28.67% of those are significant using a one-sided t-test at 
the 10% significance level. The average coefficient is very similar in magnitude to the −0.11 airline 
industry fuel exposure coefficient computed from the 1992–2003 monthly data in Carter et al. 
(2006), as well as the −0.1179 average airline fuel exposure coefficient computed from the 1994–
2008 quarterly basis data in Treanor et al. (2014).  
To check whether the reaction of airline stock prices to the varying jet fuel prices over the sample 
period affects the firm's hedging policy and potentially the hedging premium as what Treanor et al. 
(2014) find in their research, we firstly estimate airline exposure coefficients based on differing 
fuel price levels with Eq. (3). The quartiles for jet fuel price data are determined based on daily 
data of jet fuel prices between January 1992 and December 2013. The 25th and 75th quartiles are 
55.10 and 206.60 cents per gallon, respectively.  
(Insert Table 2 here) 
The results shown in Table 2 reports the estimation of Eq. (3) and illustrates that the higher costs 
of jet fuel make airlines experience much greater exposures. Columns 1 of Table 2 show the results 
using an OLS model while Columns 2 reports the results using a firm fixed effects model. Column 
3 shows the results for estimating the regression for each firm and reports the mean, median, and 
standard deviations for the coefficients of airline jet fuel exposures. We can find both Column 1 
and Column 2 of Table 2 show that higher jet fuel prices lead to greater exposures for airlines. 
More specifically, the exposure coefficient during periods of high jet fuel price (׀γ3׀=0.216) is 
almost four times greater than the exposure coefficient during periods of low jet fuel price 
(׀γ1׀=0.056). 
After testing the difference in airline exposure coefficients based on differing fuel price levels, we 
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then examine the difference between airline exposures to fuel prices for periods of rising and falling 
fuel prices. We regress the returns of the airlines against the returns of jet fuel prices during periods 
of rising and falling fuel prices with Eq. (4). 
(Insert Table 3 here) 
Table 3 presents the results from estimating Eq. (4). As the same as in Table 2, Column 1 and 
Column 2 report parameter estimates using OLS model and firm fixed effects model, respectively. 
Column 3 shows the mean, median, and the standard deviation of exposure coefficients for the 
individual airlines. As we can find in Column 1 that during the periods when jet fuel prices are 
rising, the airlines’ exposure coefficient is −0.139 rather than the −0.097 for falling jet fuel prices. 
The results are very similar in magnitude to the -0.135 for periods of rising jet fuel prices and the 
-0.091 for periods of falling jet fuel prices in Treanor et al. (2014). Moreover, the result of the Wald 
test (H0: γ1=γ2) shows that differences in the coefficients are statistically significant (p value= 0.001) 
which indicates that jet fuel exposures during periods when jet fuel price is rising are significantly 
greater than jet fuel exposures during periods when jet fuel price is falling. We can also find that 
the results remain unchanged when we use a firm fixed effect model in Column (2). Column 3 
shows the summary statistics for individual airline’s jet fuel risk exposure. The average coefficient 
for airline jet fuel exposure during quarters of increasing jet fuel prices is −0.120 (γ1) versus the 
−0.088 (γ2) for periods of decreasing jet fuel prices.  
The last regime in our exposure analysis is the one based on the volatility of jet fuel prices. We 
regress the returns of the airlines against the returns of jet fuel prices during different fuel prices 
volatility periods with Eq. (5). 
(Insert Table 4 here) 
From the results presented in Table 4, we find that the exposure coefficients during periods of high 
fuel price volatility are significantly lower than those in periods of low fuel price volatility. The 
estimation method is the same as those for the other two regimes. Columns 1 and Columns 2 of 
Table 4 show the results using OLS and firm fixed effects, respectively. Column 3 presents the 
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results for estimating the regression for the individual firm and reports the mean, median, and 
standard deviations for the airline exposure coefficients. Both Column 1 and Column 2 of Table 4 
illustrate that the exposure coefficient during periods of low fuel price volatility (׀γ1׀=0.242) is more 
than three times greater than the exposure coefficient during periods of high fuel price volatility 
(׀γ3׀=0.080). Our result is different from Treanor et al. (2014), who find that there is no significant 
difference between the exposure coefficients during periods of high fuel price volatility and those 
in periods of low fuel price volatility. However, our result is consistent with Hong and Sarkar (2008) 
who indicate that commodity beta is predicted to be a decreasing function of the company’s 
volatility of reversion of the commodity price. They argue that a higher volatility will move the 
default boundary of the commodity option further which will decrease default risk and thus will 
result in lower sensitivity (exposure).  
 
5.1.2 Analysis of the determinants of jet fuel hedging by airlines 
(Insert Table 5 here) 
After investigating the airline jet fuel exposures, we examine the determinants of jet fuel hedging 
by airlines. Firstly, we do a descriptive statistics for the variables used in the next few regression 
models of our research. The results are shown in Table 5. On average, airlines in our sample hedge 
11.6% of their next year's fuel requirements. The average hedge percentage of their next year's fuel 
requirements is very similar in magnitude to the 10.9% hedge of next year's fuel requirements 
computed from the 1992–2003 monthly data in Carter et al. (2006), as well as the 14% computed 
from the 1994–2008 quarterly basis data in Treanor et al. (2014). The average exposure coefficient 
is −0.1461 which is similar in magnitude to the −0.11 airline industry fuel exposure coefficient in 
Carter et al. (2006), as well as the −0.1179 in Treanor et al. (2014). The average of the natural 
logarithm of the Tobin’s Q is −0.276 which is also similar in magnitude to the −0.231 in Treanor 
et al. (2014). The average percentage of operating costs that are spent on jet fuel during the sample 
period is 19.9% which is larger in magnitude than the 13.75% in Carter et al. (2006). 
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(Insert Table 6 here) 
Then, to investigate whether an airline’s hedging activity is modified in response to its exposure to 
fuel prices, the corporate income taxes or other firm fundamental variables that are measures of 
financial constraints, we regress the percentage of next year's jet fuel requirements hedged 
(PerHedg) against the indicators of these three types of factors in Eq. (6). Moreover, the results 
from estimating of Eq. (6) are reported in Table 6. In Column 1, we estimate a Tobit model using 
price of jet fuel (Price_JetFuel), annual percentage change in fuel prices (year_change_JetFuel), 
and the daily standard deviation of jet fuel returns (Stdev_JetFuel) as the exposure variables. In 
Columns 2, we use Exposure, the average coefficient of each airline's quarterly exposure to fuel 
prices which is computed based on Eq. (1), as the exposure variables to run a Tobit model. In 
Columns 3, we estimate a random effects Tobit model using Exposure.  
From the results presented in Table 6, we can find that both of the control variables for expected 
financial distress cost show a significant relation with the percentage of next year's jet fuel 
requirements hedged (PerHedg). Moreover, the long-term debt to total assets ratio (LTDTA) shows 
a significant and negative relation with PerHedg while the natural logarithm of the book value of 
total assets (LnTass) shows a significant and positive relation with PerHedg, and these results are 
the same as the results in Carter et al. (2006) and Treanor et al. (2014). Since this result is generally 
inconsistent with the financial constraints argument which assumes that firms with greater expected 
financial distress costs tend to hedge more, Carter et al. (2006) suggest that airlines with greater 
distress costs choose to apply lower debt ratios and the positive relation between firm size (LnTass) 
and jet fuel hedging is the result of applying economies of scale to driving future jet fuel hedging 
decisions.  
Unlike the result in Treanor et al. (2014), we find no significant relation between the jet fuel 
hedging activities and the exposure coefficients. This result indicates that an airline’s hedging 
activity may not be modified in response to its exposure to fuel prices. For the ratio of tax loss 
carryforwards to total assets (TaxTA), the explanatory variables to control for investment 
opportunities (CAPTSAL and LnQ), the proxies of cash (Cash Flow and Cash), the indicator for 
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the effect of bankruptcy (S&P Credit and Z-Score), we do not find any significant result which is 
reliable. Among the indicators of alternative hedging activities, we find that the fuel pass-through 
indicator (Fuel_Pass) and foreign currency derivative indicator (Foreign_Currency) show a 
significant and negative relation with jet fuel hedging activities. For the portion of jet fuel costs in 
the firm’s overall capital structure (JetfuelTOpeExp), we find that all the coefficients for the three 
variables are negative but none of them is significant. 
Another importance of estimating Eq. (6) is that it can be seen as a test for the question about 
causality when we investigate whether hedging activities affect the firm value of airlines or not in 
our following research. As shown in Columns 2 and 3 of Table 6, we can find that firm value (LnQ) 
does not affect airlines’ hedging activities since both the coefficients of LnQ are not significant. It 
means that there is no issue of endogeneity when we investigate the relationship between hedging 
activities and firm value in the opposite way later.  
 
5.1.3 Analysis of the effect of hedging on firm value 
(Insert Table 7 here) 
In this section, we analyze the effect of jet fuel hedging on airline’s firm value. We regress the 
natural logarithm of Tobin's Q (LnQ) against the hedge dummy (Hedger) and the percentage of 
next year's jet fuel requirements hedged (PerHedg) in Eq. (7) and Eq. (8), respectively. The results 
of these two estimations are shown in Table 7. Columns 1 of Table 7 reports the result of the OLS 
regression with robust standard errors using the hedge dummy (Hedger). We can find that the 
coefficient of the hedge dummy (Hedger), 0.2641, is positive and significant which indicate that 
the firm values of jet fuel hedgers are greater than the firm values of non-hedgers. Moreover, the 
magnitude is much greater than the one reported by Carter et al. (2006) which is 0.0442. Columns 
2 of Table 7 shows the result of the OLS regression with robust standard errors using the percentage 
of next year's jet fuel requirements hedged (PerHedg). We can find that the portion of airline’s jet 
fuel hedging has a significant and positive effect on firm value. This result is consistent with 
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previous researches such as Carter et al. (2006) and Treanor et al. (2014). In Columns 3 and 
Columns 4 of Table 7, we use a time-series feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) model and a 
firm fixed effects model to control for heteroskedasticity and the firm fixed effects, respectively. 
Both of the coefficients of the percentage of next year's jet fuel requirements hedged (PerHedg) 
are positive and significant. Moreover, both of the coefficients, 0.2221 and 0.3247, are similar in 
magnitude to the 0.2770 and 0.3323 in Carter et al. (2006). This result is consistent with our 
hypothesis that jet fuel hedging will increase the firm value of airlines.  
For the average percentage of operating costs that are spent on jet fuel (JetfuelTOpeExp) which we 
add to the models to investigate if there is a significant relation between the operating costs spent 
on jet fuel and firm value, we can find that the coefficients of the first three models are positive but 
none of the coefficients is significant. This result suggests that the operating costs spent on jet fuel 
do not affect the firm value significantly.  
(Insert Table 8 here) 
In our research, the results in Table 6 and Table 7 seem not face the problem of endogeneity, 
because we find no significant evidence that firm value do affect airline’s jet fuel hedging activities 
while we find that airline’s jet fuel hedging activities increase firm value significantly. To confirm 
the effect of airline’s jet fuel hedging activities on firm value, we estimate Eq. (9) and Eq. (10) 
using an alternative method that is based on the change in firm value and the change in the firm’s 
hedging behavior. According to previous research, this type of regression is less likely to suffer 
from a question of causality. The results are shown in Table 8. In Columns 1 and Columns 2 of 
Table 8, we regress the change in firm value (∆LnQ) on the change in the hedger dummy (∆Hedger) 
using a pooled OLS model and an OLS with firm fixed effects model, respectively. We can find 
both the results in Columns 1 and Columns 2 of Table 8 show a positive and significant relation 
between the changes in firm value (∆LnQ) and the change in the hedger dummy (∆Hedger). In 
Columns 3 and Columns 4 of Table 8, we regress the changes in firm value (∆LnQ) on the change 
in percentage of next year's jet fuel requirements hedged (∆PerHedg) using a pooled OLS model 
and an OLS with firm fixed effects model, respectively. We get positive and significant coefficients 
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for the hedging behavior. All the results in Table 8 help us confirm the significant and positive 
effect of airline’s hedging behavior on the firm value which is shown by the results in Table 7.  
 
5.2 Results of how hedging affect firm value of airlines specifically 
 
5.2.1 Analysis of the effect of jet fuel hedging on firm value at different hedging levels 
(Insert Table 9 here) 
To explore in what specific ways jet fuel hedging does affect the firm value of airlines, we, firstly, 
investigate if the effect jet fuel hedging on firm value of airlines varies based on different hedging 
levels. We estimate Eq. (11) by regressing the change in the natural logarithm of Tobin's Q against 
the change in the percentage of next year's jet fuel requirements hedged in different hedging levels. 
Table 9 presents the results for the estimation of Eq. (11). In Column 1 of Table 9, we use an OLS 
model with robust standard errors. We can find that the coefficients for the change in percentage 
of next year's jet fuel requirements hedged when the percentage of next year's jet fuel requirements 
hedged is in the lower tertile (∆PerHedg_l) and the change in percentage of next year's jet fuel 
requirements hedged when the percentage of next year's jet fuel requirements hedged is between 
the lower tertile and the upper tertile (∆PerHedg_m) are both positive and significant, while the 
coefficient for the change in percentage of next year's jet fuel requirements hedged when the 
percentage of next year's jet fuel requirements hedged is in the upper tertile (∆PerHedg_h) is 
positive but insignificant. For the magnitude of the coefficients, the one of ∆PerHedg_m (0.4996) 
is greater than that of ∆PerHedg_l (0.2971) and ∆PerHedg_h (0.2846). This result suggests that 
hedging behavior of airlines when the percentage of next year's jet fuel requirements hedged is low 
(PerHedg <= 11%) or the percentage of next year's jet fuel requirements hedged is in a medium 
range (11% < PerHedg <= 36%) show positive and significant effect on firm value, while hedging 
behavior of airlines when the percentage of next year's jet fuel requirements hedged is high 
(PerHedg > 36%) do not show significant effect on firm value. Moreover, airlines will experience 
the greatest increase in firm value when they increase their hedging percentage of next year's jet 
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fuel requirements when it is at the medium level (11% < PerHedg <= 36%). This result is 
inconsistent with our null hypothesis that higher level of jet fuel hedging will increase the firm 
value of airlines more than the lower level of jet fuel hedging does. 
In Columns 2 and Column 3 of Table 9, we use a time-series feasible generalized least squares 
(FGLS) model and a firm fixed effects model, respectively. The results shown in Columns 2 and 
Column 3 of Table 9 are the same as that in Column 1 of Table 9. These results suggest that hedging 
behaviors of airlines when the percentage of next year's jet fuel requirements hedged is in lower 
level (PerHedg <= 11%) and in a medium range (11% < PerHedg <= 36%) are better for the firm 
value than hedging behaviors when the percentage of next year's jet fuel requirements hedged is in 
higher level (PerHedg > 36%).  
 
5.2.2 Analysis of the effect of hedging and exposure on firm value 
In this section, we analyze the joint effect of jet fuel hedging and fuel price exposure on firm value. 
We estimate Eq. (12) by regressing the natural logarithm of Tobin's Q (LnQ) against the percentage 
of next year's jet fuel requirements hedged in different jet fuel exposure levels. Table 10 reports the 
results of our estimation of Eq. (12). 
(Insert Table 10 here) 
As the same as in Table 9, Column 1 of Table 10 shows the results of an OLS model with robust 
standard errors, while Column 2 and Column 3 of Table 10 present the results of a time-series 
feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) model and a firm fixed effects model, respectively. From 
the results shown in Table 10, we can find that jet fuel hedging behaviors of airlines based on the 
different levels of jet fuel price exposures do not affect the firm value significantly. Although, some 
coefficients for the different levels of jet fuel price exposures show a significant result in one of 
the three models, none of them shows any significant effect on firm value over the three models. 
These results suggest that there is no significant joint effect of jet fuel hedging and fuel price 
exposure on firm value. The airlines will not be valued more based on the jet fuel hedging behaviors 
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of airlines based on the different levels of jet fuel price exposure. The results of our research are 
the same as that in Treanor et al. (2014) which indicate that investors do not value hedging more 
because of higher jet fuel price exposures.  
 
5.2.3 Analysis of the effect of hedging on firm value for different hedger types 
To investigate if selective hedging is good for an airline’s firm value, we regress the natural 
logarithm of Tobin's Q (LnQ) against the percentage of next year's jet fuel requirements hedged in 
different hedger types based on Eq. (13). Table 11 presents the results for the estimation of Eq. (13).  
(Insert Table 11 here) 
In Column 1 of Table 11, we use an OLS model with robust standard errors. We can find that the 
coefficients of the percentage of next year's jet fuel requirements hedged of the selective hedgers 
are positive and significant, while the coefficients of the percentage of next year's jet fuel 
requirements hedged of the passive hedgers and neutral hedgers are insignificant. This result 
suggests that selective hedging has a significant and positive effect on the firm value of airlines. 
According to the magnitude of the coefficients, we can find the coefficient of the percentage of 
next year's jet fuel requirements hedged of the passive hedgers is negative (-1.0405) and the 
coefficient of the percentage of next year's jet fuel requirements hedged of neutral hedgers (0.0382) 
is more than five times less than that of the coefficient for the percentage of next year's jet fuel 
requirements hedged of selective hedgers (0.2157). These results suggest that passive hedging 
strategies may do harm for the firm value of airlines, and neutral hedging strategies seems do not 
have a significant effect on airlines’ firm value. 
Columns 2 and Column 3 of Table 11 report the results for the estimation of a time-series feasible 
generalized least squares (FGLS) model and a firm fixed effects model, respectively. The results 
shown in Columns 2 and Column 3 of Table 11 also suggest that selective hedging has a significant 
and positive effect on the firm value of airlines while passive hedging strategies appear to do harm 




Thus, according to the results shown in Table 11, our research presents evidence which suggests 
that the airlines can apply selective hedging strategies to increase firm value. This result is 
inconsistent with many previous research such as Adam and Fernando (2006) and Brown et al. 
(2006) who find that the economic gains from selective hedging are small in the gold mining 
industry as well as Treanor et al. (2014) who find that selective hedging strategies may do more 
harm than good to firm value. 
 
5.2.4 Analysis of the effect of hedging on firm value at different levels of the average 
percentage of operating costs spent on jet fuel 
In this section, we analyze if the effect of the percentage of the fuel requirements hedged on firm 
value varies based on the levels of operating costs that are spent on jet fuel. Table 12 reports the 
results of the estimation of Eq. (14) in which we regress the natural logarithm of Tobin's Q (LnQ) 
against the percentage of next year's jet fuel requirements hedged in different levels of the average 
percentage of operating costs that are spent on jet fuel. We run an OLS model with robust standard 
errors in Column 1 of Table 12, and a time-series feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) model 
and a firm fixed effect model in Column 2 and Column 3 of Table 12, respectively. 
(Insert Table 12 here) 
From the results shown in Table 12, we can find that the effect of the percentage of the fuel 
requirements hedged on firm value shows some difference based on the levels of the average 
percentage of operating costs that are spent on jet fuel. The coefficients of the percentage of next 
year's jet fuel requirements hedged at a high level of operating costs spent on jet fuel are positive 
and significant in Column 1 and Column 3. This result may suggest that hedging behaviors when 
operating costs spent on jet fuel is high is helpful for increasing the firm value of airlines. For the 
coefficients of the percentage of next year's jet fuel requirements hedged at the low and medium 
levels of operating costs spent on jet fuel, all of them are positive but insignificant except for the 
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one in the time-series feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) model for the coefficient of the 
medium range of JetfuelTOpeExp. These results suggest that hedging behaviors when the level of 
operating costs spent on jet fuel is low or in the medium range do not show a significant effect on 
firm value.  
From the magnitude of the coefficients, we can conclude that hedging behaviors when the level of 
operating costs spent on jet fuel is high can increase firm value more. For example, according to 
the results in Column 1 of Table, a 12,1% increase in the hedging of next year's jet fuel requirements 
when level of operating costs spent on jet fuel is high can increase the natural logarithm of Tobin's 
Q (LnQ) by 0.3103% which is greater than 0.1847% for the medium range and 0.1734% for the 
low level of operating costs that are spent on jet fuel.  
 
5.2.5 Analysis of the effect of hedging on firm value at different levels of jet fuel price 
volatility 
To examine if jet fuel hedging behaviors affect firm value differently based on different levels of 
jet fuel price volatility, we regress the natural logarithm of Tobin's Q (LnQ) against the percentage 
of next year's jet fuel requirements hedged at different levels of jet fuel price volatility based on 
Eq. (15). The results for the estimation of Eq. (15) are shown in Table 13.  
(Insert Table 13 here) 
Column 1 of Table 13 shows the results of an OLS model with robust standard errors, Column 2 of 
Table 13 reports the results of a time-series feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) model and 
Column 3 of Table 10 presents the results of a firm fixed effects model. We can find that the 
coefficients of the change in the percentage of next year's jet fuel requirements hedged in periods 
of volatile jet fuel prices are positive and significant for all three models, but none of the 
coefficients of the change in the percentage of next year's jet fuel requirements hedged in periods 
of stable jet fuel prices are significant. This result suggests that the change in jet fuel hedging in 
periods of volatile jet fuel prices can affect firm value significantly and positively while the change 
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in jet fuel hedging in periods of low jet fuel price volatility has few impact on firm value.  
From the magnitude of the coefficients, we can find the change in the percentage of next year's jet 
fuel requirements hedged in periods of volatile jet fuel prices has a much greater effect on the 
change of firm value than the change in the percentage of next year's jet fuel requirements hedged 
in periods of stable jet fuel prices does. Moreover, according to the results of the time-series feasible 
generalized least squares (FGLS) model shown in Column 2 of Table 13, a 1% increase of the 
change in the percentage of next year's jet fuel requirements hedged during the periods of volatile 
jet fuel prices can increase the change in the natural logarithm of Tobin's Q (LnQ) by 0.7361% 
which is more than three times greater than 0.2005% for the effect during the periods of stable jet 
fuel prices.  
Based on the discussion about the results shown in Table 13 above, our research presents evidence 
which suggests that hedging can help airlines improve their firm value more in periods of volatile 
jet fuel prices. In periods of volatile jet fuel prices, when airlines increase their jet fuel hedging, 
firm value increases significantly. However, in periods of stable jet fuel prices, the increase of jet 
fuel hedging has little effect on the firm value of airlines.  
 
6. Conclusion 
The U.S. airlines industry which is largely homogeneous and competitive offers an ideal 
environment for studying the effect hedging behaviors on firm value since airlines generally face 
jet fuel prices risk which is substantial and hedgeable, and jet fuel is a volatile cost-based 
underlying assets. In our study, we examine the relation between jet fuel hedging and firm value 
using data of 36 publicly-traded U.S. airlines during the period from 1992 to 2013. Unlike many 
previous studies which focus on whether hedging can add firm value or not, our analyses focus on 
the specific ways in which jet fuel hedging behaviors by airlines can affect firm value. 
Following Treanor et al. (2014), we, firstly, investigate how the airline exposures of jet fuel prices 
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react to the change in jet fuel price regimes. The results of our research demonstrate that the jet 
fuel exposures of airlines are higher when jet fuel price is high, or it is rising. These results are the 
same as what Treanor et al. (2014) find in their study. However, differently, we find that the 
exposure coefficients during periods of volatile fuel prices are significantly lower than those in 
periods of stable fuel prices. This result is consistent with Hong and Sarkar (2008) who suggests 
that the exposure coefficients are lower during higher volatility environments since he believes that 
a higher volatility will move the default boundary of the commodity option held by firms farther 
which will decrease default risk and thus will result in lower exposures.  
Then, we confirm the positive relationship between jet fuel hedging and the firm value of airlines 
as shown in Carter et al. (2006). We find a much greater coefficient for the hedge dummy (Hedger), 
and it suggests that airlines that hedge for the jet fuel requirements have higher firm value in recent 
years. However, we also find that the hedging premium is decreasing in recent years as Treanor et 
al. (2014) find in their research. 
For the specific effect of jet fuel hedging on firm value, we, firstly, find that although the percentage 
of next year's jet fuel requirements hedged is significantly positively related to firm value, it does 
not mean that airlines can increase their firm value substantially by increasing the amount of jet 
fuel hedged. According to our analyses, hedging behavior of airlines when the percentage of next 
year's jet fuel requirements hedged is at a lower level (PerHedg <= 11%) and a medium level (11% 
< PerHedg <= 36%) are better for firm value. However, when the percentage of next year's jet fuel 
requirements hedged is at a higher level (PerHedg > 36%), hedging behaviors do not affect the 
firm value significantly. If airlines want to increase firm value by increasing the amount of jet fuel 
hedged, we suggest them to control their hedge for jet fuel requirements in a medium range (11% 
< PerHedg <= 36%). We also find evidence which supports that airlines can apply selective jet fuel 
hedging strategies to increase the firm value of airlines. In our analyses, the coefficients of the 
percentage of next year's jet fuel requirements hedged of the selective hedgers are positive and 
significant, while the coefficients of the percentage of next year's jet fuel requirements hedged of 
the passive hedgers are negative and insignificant. These results suggest that selective hedging has 
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a significant and positive effect on firm value while passive hedging strategies appear to do harm 
to firm value. For different levels of operating costs spent on jet fuel, we find that jet fuel hedging 
is helpful to increase the firm value if they spend high level of operating costs on jet fuel. This 
result suggests that airlines can increase their firm value significantly by increasing the amount of 
jet fuel hedged if their operating costs spent on jet fuel is high (> 27%). Moreover, we also find 
that the change in jet fuel hedging can increase the firm value significantly during the period of 
volatile jet fuel prices. This result is consistent with the hypothesis that hedging can help airlines 
to improve their firm value more in periods of volatile jet fuel prices. It means that investors do 
value jet fuel hedging more in periods of volatile jet fuel prices. For different levels of jet fuel 
exposures, we find no evidence that the effect of jet fuel hedging behaviors on firm value will show 
any difference based on different levels of jet fuel exposures. This result means that there is no 
significant joint effect of jet fuel hedging and jet fuel price exposure on firm value. The airlines 
will not be valued more based on the increase of jet fuel hedging only because of the different 
levels of jet fuel price exposures. 
In our research, we try to provide guidelines to the airlines’ use of the jet fuel hedging derivatives 
to increase firm value. According to the analyses in our paper, we suggest airlines to manage their 
jet fuel hedging based on the hedging level, the hedger types, the operating costs spent on jet fuel 
and the level of jet fuel price volatility which can help them increase firm value effectively. For 
further research, we suggest researchers to check whether the different effects of hedging behaviors 
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Figure 1 presents the monthly spot price per gallon of kerosene-type jet fuel in New York 
Harbor, the Gulf Coast, and Los Angeles during the sample period from January 1992 to 
December 2013.  
 
 
Figure 2 presents the average yearly Tobin’s Q for all sample airlines during the sample period 








































































































































Figure 1. Monthly Jet Fuel Prices





































































































Table 1: Summary statistics of airline jet fuel exposure coefficients 
This table reports descriptive statistics of the quarterly jet fuel price exposures for each airline 
during the sample period from 1992 to 2013. It also lists the percentage of years in which each 
airline reported using of jet fuel hedging derivatives. The quarterly jet fuel price exposures are 
calculated using Eq. (1): (Ri,t = αi+βi,q*Rm,t+γi,q*RJet Fuel,t+εi,t).  
Airline N Mean Median Std.dev. Min. Max. % Neg. % sig. at 
10% 
% of years 
hedged 
A T A Holdings Corp 36 -0.073 -0.032 0.450 -2.163 0.736 58.33% 13.89% 0.00% 
Airtran  64 -0.155 -0.163 0.281 -0.707 0.750 81.25% 32.81% 75.00% 
Airways Corp 10 0.061 0.042 0.127 -0.120 0.292 30.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Alaska Airgroup  84 -0.151 -0.146 0.221 -0.668 0.331 77.38% 45.24% 80.95% 
Allegiant Travel Corp 29 -0.236 -0.264 0.252 -0.690 0.464 82.76% 44.83% 25.00% 
America West Airline 48 -0.083 -0.131 0.464 -1.697 1.181 64.58% 31.25% 66.67% 
American Airlines  84 -0.327 -0.200 0.451 -2.128 0.568 80.95% 36.90% 95.24% 
ASA Holdings Inc 20 -0.094 -0.095 0.190 -0.369 0.392 75.00% 20.00% 20.00% 
Atlantic Coast Airline 36 -0.141 -0.138 0.277 -0.790 0.484 63.89% 33.33% 22.22% 
C C A I R  20 -0.003 0.064 0.352 -0.836 0.612 50.00% 5.00% 0.00% 
Comair  16 -0.102 -0.073 0.291 -0.732 0.313 56.25% 18.75% 0.00% 
Continental Airline 64 -0.252 -0.251 0.309 -1.008 0.453 78.13% 50.00% 75.00% 
Delta Airlines  80 -0.219 -0.122 0.305 -1.255 0.266 75.00% 31.25% 75.00% 
Expressjet  31 -0.149 -0.175 0.366 -0.999 0.933 77.42% 41.94% 12.50% 
Frontier Airlines  46 -0.041 -0.106 0.371 -0.600 1.629 65.22% 34.78% 50.00% 
Great Lakes Aviation 76 0.010 0.073 1.456 -4.553 7.055 44.74% 13.16% 0.00% 
GIG 9 -0.269 -0.278 0.331 -0.798 0.169 77.78% 22.22% 33.33% 
Hawaiian Airlines  75 -0.107 -0.096 0.355 -1.642 0.779 62.67% 26.67% 88.24% 
Jetblue Airways  47 -0.272 -0.274 0.245 -0.806 0.170 87.23% 51.06% 100.00% 
Mair  52 0.025 -0.028 0.225 -0.300 1.026 53.85% 15.38% 0.00% 
Mesa Airlines  56 -0.151 -0.119 0.311 -1.560 0.465 67.86% 26.79% 0.00% 
Midway Airlines  13 -0.083 -0.070 0.181 -0.612 0.104 69.23% 7.69% 0.00% 
Midwest Air Group  44 -0.130 -0.093 0.258 -0.937 0.473 65.91% 22.73% 54.55% 
Northwest Airlines 48 -0.143 -0.165 0.493 -1.547 2.499 79.17% 35.42% 75.00% 
Pinnacle Airlines  33 -0.101 -0.122 0.254 -0.742 0.771 75.76% 9.09% 11.11% 
Reno Air  12 -0.136 -0.146 0.371 -0.859 0.572 58.33% 16.67% 0.00% 
Republic Airways  39 -0.171 -0.098 0.287 -0.937 0.415 79.49% 25.64% 30.00% 
Skywest  88 -0.127 -0.123 0.212 -0.816 0.399 75.00% 20.45% 0.00% 
Southwest Airlines 80 -0.114 -0.109 0.177 -0.596 0.373 77.50% 38.75% 90.00% 
Spirit Airlines  11 -0.239 -0.254 0.302 -0.769 0.317 81.82% 27.27% 66.67% 
Tower Air  12 0.009 -0.002 0.257 -0.592 0.351 50.00% 8.33% 0.00% 
Trans World Airline 18 -0.031 -0.075 0.274 -0.421 0.782 66.67% 5.56% 20.00% 
UAL 80 -0.249 -0.129 0.385 -1.986 0.365 81.25% 35.00% 75.00% 
US Airways Group  87 -0.301 -0.231 0.686 -5.173 0.952 75.86% 32.18% 66.67% 
Vanguard Airlines  24 0.054 0.063 0.388 -0.787 0.770 45.83% 0.00% 0.00% 
World Airways  43 -0.028 -0.086 0.286 -0.508 0.647 60.47% 4.65% 0.00% 
Total Sample 1,615 -0.146 -0.120 0.473 -5.173 7.055 71.00% 28.67% 47.07% 
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Table 2: Risk exposure during periods of high and low fuel prices 
This table reports the coefficients estimated from Eq. (3): Ri,t = α0 + β1Rmkt,t +γ1Jet Fueli(l) + 
γ2Jet Fueli(m) + γ3Jet Fueli(h) + ei,t where Ri,t is the daily return for airline I and Rmkt,t is the daily 
market return. Jet Fueli
(l) is the daily percentage change in the price of jet fuel when the price 
of fuel is below the 25th quartile, otherwise zero. Jet Fueli
(m) is the daily percent change in the 
price of jet fuel when the price of fuel is between the 25th and 75th quartiles, otherwise zero. Jet 
Fueli
(h) is the daily percentage change in the price of jet fuel when the price of fuel is above the 
75th quartile, otherwise zero. The quartiles are determined over the sample period 1992–2013. 
The 25th and 75th quartiles are 55.10 and 206.60, respectively. We use two different types of 
models to estimate Eq. (3). Column (1) reports the results using OLS. In Column (2), we use a 
firm fixed effects regression model. Column (3) reports the mean, median, and standard 
deviation of the coefficients from the model by running each airline separately. The parentheses 
below the coefficients report the p-value for each coefficient. Statistical significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 Column (1) 
OLS 
Column (2) 



































Sample size 99976 99976  


















Table 3: Risk exposures during periods of rising and falling fuel prices 
This table reports the coefficients estimated from Eq. (4): Ri,t = α0 + β1Rmkt,t +γ1Jet Fueli(r) + 
γ2Jet Fueli(f) + ei,t, where Ri,t is the daily return for airline I and Rmkt,t is the daily market return. 
Jet Fuel(r) is the daily return of fuel prices during quarters when the average daily percentage 
change in the fuel prices is positive, and Jet Fuel(f) is the daily return of fuel prices during 
quarters when the average daily percentage change in the fuel prices is negative. Column (1) 
reports the results using OLS. In Column (2), we use a firm fixed effects regression. Column 
(3) reports the mean, median, and standard deviation of the coefficients from the model by 
running each airline separately. The parentheses below the coefficients report the p-value for 
each coefficient. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and 
***, respectively.  
 Column (1) 
OLS 
Column (2) 



























Sample size 96951 96951  




















Table 4: Risk exposures during periods of high and low fuel price volatility 
This table reports the coefficients estimated from Eq. (5): Ri,t = α0 + β1Rmkt,t +γ1Jet Fuel Voli(l) 
+ γ2Jet Fuel Voli(m) + γ3Jet Fuel Voli(h) + ei,t where Ri,t is the daily return for airline I and Rmkt,t 
is the daily market return. Jet Fuel Voli
(l) is the daily percentage change in the price of jet fuel 
when the standard deviation of the price of fuel is below the 25th quartile, otherwise zero. Jet 
Fuel Voli
(m) is the daily percentage change in the price of jet fuel when the standard deviation 
of the price of fuel is between the 25th and 75th quartiles, otherwise zero. Jet Fuel Voli
(h) is the 
daily percentage change in the price of jet fuel when the standard deviation of the price of fuel 
is above the 75th quartile, otherwise zero. The quartiles are determined over the sample period 
1992–2013. The 25th and 75th quartiles are 0.01616 and 0.02516, respectively. Column (1) 
reports the results using OLS. In Column (2), we use a firm fixed effects regression. Column 
(3) reports the mean, median, and standard deviation of the coefficients from the model by 
running each airline separately. The parentheses below the coefficients report the p-value for 
each coefficient. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and 
***, respectively. 
 Column (1) 
OLS 
Column (2) 


































Sample size 99976 99976  
















Table 5: Summary statistics 
Panel A lists the variable name, data source and variable definition of each variable used in the 
regression models in the following part of our study. Panel B provides the summary statistics 
for these variables. The data are collected from the airlines' 10-K filings, CRSP, and Compustat 
over the sample period 1992–2013. 
Panel A   
Variable Name Data Source Variable Definition 
PerHedg 10-K reports 
The percentage next year's jet fuel 
requirements hedged. 
Exposure 
CRSP: the stock price of 




The airline's jet fuel exposure coefficient. It 
is the estimated coefficient of the daily return 
on the Gulf Coast spot jet fuel prices (RJet 
Fuel) when we regress the daily stock price 
return of of airline i on day t (Ri,t) against the 
CRSP equally-weighted market portfolio 
return for day t (Rmkt,t) and the daily return on 
the Gulf Coast spot jet fuel prices for day t 
(RJet Fuel,t).  
Price_JetFuel 




The price of jet fuel. 
Year_Change_JetFuel 




The annual percentage change in fuel prices. 
Stdev_JetFuel 








Codes: AT, TLCF. 
The ratio of tax loss carryforwards (TLCF) to 
total assets (AT). 
CAPTSAL 
Compustat 
Codes: CAPX, SALE. 
The ratio of capital expenditures (CAPX) to 
sales (SALE). 
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Table 5-Continued   
Variable Name Data Source Variable Definition 
LnQ 
Compustat 
Codes: ACT, AT, DLTT, 
INVT, LCT, MKVALT, 
PSTKL. 
The natural log of Tobin's Q. Tobin's Q is 
estimated using the simple approximation 
approach proposed by Chung and Pruitt 
(1994). The formula is as follows: (market 
value of equity (MKVALT) + liquidation 
value of preferred stock (PSTKL) + the book 
values of long-term debt (DLTT) and current 
liabilities (LCT) - current assets (ACT) + 
book value of inventory (INVT)) / book 
value of total assets (AT). 
LTDTA 
Compustat 
Codes: AT, DLTT. 
The ratio of long-term debt (DLTT) to total 




The natural logarithm of the book value of 
total assets (AT). 
Cash_Flow 
Compustat 
Codes: CHE, SALE. 




Codes: CH, SALE. 





The S&P credit ratings. It is numerically 
scaled from 2 to 27, and lower numbers 
reflect higher credit ratings. For the airlines 
which have no credit rating, we code them 
with a value of 30 for this variable as in 
Carter et al. (2006) and Treanor et al. (2014). 
Z_Score 
Compustat 
Codes: AT, EBIT, LT, 
MKVALT, RE, SALE, 
WCAP. 
Altman’s Z-score. It is calculated as 
introduced in Altman (1968). The formula is 
as follows: Z = 1.2X1 + 1.4X2 + 3.3X3 + 
0.6X4 + 0.99X5, where X1 = Working Capital 
(WCAP) / Total Assets (AT), X2 = Retained 
Earnings (RE) / Total Assets (AT), X3 = 
Earnings Before Interest and Taxes (EBIT) / 
Total Assets (AT), X4 = Market Value of 
Equity (MKVALT) / Book Value of Total 




Table 5-Continued   
Variable Name Data Source Variable Definition 
Fuel_Pass 10-K reports 
Fuel pass-through indicator. It is a dummy 
variable which equals to one for firms that a 
fuel pass-through agreement is reported in 
the company's 10-K filing, otherwise zero. 
Dividend 10-K reports 
The dividend indicator. It is a dummy 
variable which equals to one for firms that 
pay dividends, otherwise zero. 
Charter 10-K reports 
Charter indicator. It is a dummy variable 
which equals to one when firms disclose that 
chartering is a significant part of their 
businesses, otherwise zero. 
Foreign_Currency 10-K reports 
The foreign currency derivative indicator. It 
is a dummy variable which equals to one 
when firms use foreign currency derivative, 
otherwise zero. 
Interest_Rate 10-K reports 
The interest rate derivative indicator. It is a 
dummy variable which equals to one when 




Codes: SALE, XAD. 
The ratio of advertising expense (XAD) to 
sales (SALE). 
JetfuelTOpeExp 10-K reports 
The average percentage of operating costs 












Table 5-Continued   
Panel B   
Variable Mean Median Std.Dev. Min. Max. 
PerHedg 0.116 0.000 0.184 0.000 0.950 
Exposure -0.145 -0.12 0.253 -1.660 0.877 
Price_JetFuel 1.283 0.824 0.885 0.403 3.056 
Year_Change_JetFuel 0.124 0.139 0.381 -0.519 1.060 
Stdev_JetFuel 0.167 0.115 0.165 0.030 0.798 
TaxTA 0.108 0.000 0.312 0.000 3.635 
CAPTSAL 0.103 0.069 0.120 -0.010 1.030 
LnQ -0.276 -0.302 0.617 -4.236 1.380 
LTDTA 0.291 0.294 0.180 0.000 0.938 
LnTass 7.312 7.272 1.959 2.693 10.864 
Cash_Flow 0.226 0.200 0.211 -0.825 1.213 
Cash 0.119 0.096 0.112 0.000 1.195 
S_P_Rating 23.526 30.000 7.318 8.000 30.000 
Z_Score 1.556 1.401 1.418 -8.330 7.917 
Fuel_Pass 0.241 0.000 0.428 0.000 1.000 
Dividend 0.216 0.000 0.412 0.000 1.000 
Charter 0.491 0.000 0.501 0.000 1.000 
Foreign_Currency 0.197 0.000 0.398 0.000 1.000 
Interest_Rate 0.327 0.000 0.470 0.000 1.000 
AdvTSales 0.009 0.006 0.013 0.000 0.098 







Table 6: Determinants of jet fuel hedging by airlines 
This table reports the coefficients estimated from Eq. (6): PerHedgi,y = f (Exposure proxies, Tax 
proxy, Financial constraints measurement proxies) where PerHedgi,y is the percentage of next 
year's jet fuel requirements hedged for airline i in year y; Exposure proxies include the airline's 
jet fuel exposure coefficient (Exposure), the price of jet fuel (Price_JetFuel), the annual 
percentage change in fuel prices (Year_Change_JetFuel), and the daily standard deviation of 
jet fuel returns (Stdev_JetFuel); The tax proxy (TaxTA) is the ratio of tax loss carryforwards to 
total assets; The financial constraint measurement proxies include the ratio of capital 
expenditures to sales (CAPTSAL), the natural log of Tobin's Q (LnQ), the ratio of long-term debt 
to total assets (LTDTA), the natural logarithm of the book value of total assets (LnTass), the 
ratio of cash flow to sales (Cash_Flow), the ratio of cash holdings to sales (Cash), the S&P 
credit ratings (S_P_Rating), the Altman’s Z-score (Z_Score), the fuel pass-through indicator 
(Fuel_Pass), the dividend indicator (Dividend), the charter indicator (Charter), the foreign 
currency derivative indicator (Foreign_Currency), the interest rate derivative indicator 
(Interest_Rate), the ratio of advertising expense to sales (AdvTSales) and the average 
percentage of operating costs spent on jet fuel (JetfuelTOpeExp). Column 1 uses a Tobit model 
which includes only the jet fuel pricing variables. In Column 2 and Column 3, we use a Tobit 
model and a random effects Tobit model which only include the exposure variable. The 
parentheses below the coefficients report the p-value for each coefficient. Statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 































































Table 6-Continued    


































































# observations 407 407 407 
# censored 214 214 214 
Log likelihood -75.832 -78.427 -68.450 
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Table 7: The effect of hedging on firm value 
This table reports the coefficients estimated from Eq. (7): LnQi,y = α + β1 ∗ Hedger + β2–
16(Control Variablesi,y) + ei,y and Eq. (8): LnQi,y = α + β1 ∗ PerHedgi,y + β2–16(Control 
Variablesi,y) + ei,y, where LnQi,y is the natural logarithm of Tobin's Q for airline i in year y; 
Hedger is a hedge dummy which equals one if a firm hedges any portion of next year’s jet fuel 
requirements, otherwise zero; PerHedgi,y is the percentage of next year's jet fuel requirements 
hedged for airline i in year y. The control variables are the same as those we use in the 
estimation of Eq. (6). Column (1) and Column (2) report the results of Eq. (7) and Eq. (8) using 
an OLS with robust standard errors, respectively. In Column (3), we estimate Eq. (8) using an 
FGLS model to control for heteroscedasticity. In Column (4), we estimate Eq. (8) using a firm 
fixed effects model. The parentheses below the coefficients report the p-value for each 
coefficient. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, 
respectively.  
 Column (1) 
OLS with robust 
standard errors 
Column (2) 


















































































































































Sample size 407 407 407 407 











Table 8: The effect of changes in hedging on changes in firm value 
This table reports the coefficients estimated from Eq. (9): ∆LnQi,y = α + β1 ∗ ∆Hedger + β2–
16(∆Control Variablesi,y) + ei,y and Eq. (10): ∆LnQi,y = α + β1 ∗ ∆PerHedgi,y + β2–16(∆Control 
Variablesi,y) + ei,y, where ∆LnQi,y is the change in the natural logarithm of Tobin's Q for airline 
i in year y; ∆Hedgeri,y is the first difference of the hedger dummy for airline i in year y; 
∆PerHedgi,y is the first difference of the percent of next year's jet fuel requirements hedged for 
airline i in year y; ∆Control Variables is the first difference of the other firm control variables 
used in Eq. (8). Column (1) and Column (2) report the results of Eq. (9) using a pooled OLS 
model and an OLS model with firm fixed effects, respectively. Column (3) and Column (4) 
report the results of Eq. (10) using a pooled OLS model and an OLS model with firm fixed 
effects, respectively. The parentheses below the coefficients report the p-value for each 
coefficient. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, 
respectively. 
 Column (1) 
Pooled OLS  
Column (2) 



















































































































































Sample size 370 370 370 370 











Table 9: The effect of changes in hedging on changes in firm value at different hedging levels 
This table reports the coefficients estimated from Eq. (11): ∆LnQi,y = α + β1 ∗ ∆PerHedg_l + β2 
∗∆PerHedg_m+ β3 ∗∆PerHedg_h + β4–17(Control Variablesi,y) + ei,y where ∆LnQi,y is the change 
in the natural logarithm of Tobin's Q for airline i in year y; ∆PerHedg_l is the change in 
percentage of next year's jet fuel requirements hedged (∆PerHedg) when the percent of next 
year's jet fuel requirements hedged (PerHedg) is in the lower tertile, otherwise zero; 
∆PerHedg_m is the change in percentage of next year's jet fuel requirements hedged (∆PerHedg) 
when the percent of next year's jet fuel requirements hedged (PerHedg) is between the lower 
tertile and the upper tertile, otherwise zero; ∆PerHedg_h is the changes in percent of next year's 
jet fuel requirements hedged (∆PerHedg) when the percentage of next year's jet fuel requirements 
hedged (PerHedg) is in the upper tertile, otherwise zero; ∆Control Variables is the first difference 
of the other firm control variables used in Eq. (8). Column 1 uses OLS with robust standard errors. 
In Columns 2, we use an FGLS model to control for heteroskedasticity. Column 3 uses a firm 
fixed effects model. The parentheses below the coefficients report the p-value for each coefficient. 
Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 Column (1) 


















































































































Sample size 185 185 185 









Table 10: The effect of hedging on firm value at different Exposure levels 
This table reports the coefficients estimated from Eq. (12): LnQi,y = α + β1 ∗ PerHedge_expL 
+ β2 ∗ PerHedge_expM + β3∗ PerHedge_expH + β4–17(Control Variablesi,y) + ei,y where LnQi,y 
is the natural logarithm of Tobin's Q for airline i in year y; PerHedg_expL is the percentage of 
the fuel requirements hedged when Exposure coefficient is above the 75th quartile, otherwise 
zero. PerHedg_expM is the fuel requirements hedged when Exposure coefficient is between the 
25th and 75th quartiles, otherwise zero. PerHedg_expH the fuel requirements hedged when 
Exposure coefficient is below the 25th quartile, otherwise zero. The 25th and 75th quartiles are -
0.2561 and 0.0072, respectively. Control Variables is the other firm control variables used in 
Eq. (8). Column 1 uses an OLS model with robust standard errors. In Columns 2, we use an 
FGLS model to control for heteroskedasticity. Column 3 uses a firm fixed effects model. The 
parentheses below the coefficients report the p-value for each coefficient. Statistical 
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% is indicated by *, **, ***, respectively.  
 Column (1) 


















































































































Sample size 407 407 407 









Table 11: The effect of hedging on firm value for different hedger types 
This table reports the coefficients estimated from Eq. (13): LnQi,y = α + β1 ∗ PerHedg_P + β2 
∗ PerHedg_N + β3∗ PerHedg_S + β4–17(Control Variablesi,y) + ei,y where LnQi,y is the natural 
logarithm of Tobin's Q for airline i in year y; PerHedg_P is the percentage of the fuel 
requirements hedged when the airline is classified as passive hedger as its standard deviation 
of the PerHedg variable is in the lower tertile, otherwise zero. PerHedg_N is the percentage of 
the fuel requirements hedged when the airline is classified as a neutral hedger as its standard 
deviation of the PerHedg variable is between the lower tertile and the upper tertile, otherwise 
zero. PerHedg_S is the percentage of the fuel requirements hedged when the airline is classified 
as a selective hedger as its standard deviation of the PerHedg variable is in the upper tertile, 
otherwise zero. Column 1 uses an OLS model with robust standard errors. In Columns 2, we 
use an FGLS model to control for heteroskedasticity. Column 3 uses a firm fixed effects model. 
The parentheses below the coefficients report the p-value for each coefficient. Statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 Column (1) 


















































































































Sample size 291 291 291 









Table 12: The effect of hedging on firm value at different levels of jet fuel costs 
This table reports the coefficients estimated from Eq. (14): LnQi,y = α + β1 ∗ PerHedg_jetL + 
β2 ∗ PerHedg_jetM + β3∗ PerHedg_jetH + β4–17(Control Variablesi,y) + ei,y where LnQi,y is the 
natural logarithm of Tobin's Q for airline i in year y; PerHedg_jetL is the percentage of the fuel 
requirements hedged when the average percentage of operating costs spent on jet fuel is below 
the 25th quartile, otherwise zero. PerHedg_jetM is the percentage of the fuel requirements 
hedged when the average percentage of operating costs spent on jet fuel is between the 25th and 
75th quartiles, otherwise zero. PerHedg_jetH is the percentage of the fuel requirements hedged 
when the average percentage of operating costs spent on jet fuel is above the 75th quartile, 
otherwise zero. The 25th and 75th quartiles are 0.126 and 0.270, respectively. Column 1 uses an 
OLS model with robust standard errors. In Columns 2, we use an FGLS model to control for 
heteroskedasticity. Column 3 uses a firm fixed effects model. The parentheses below the 
coefficients report the p-value for each coefficient. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 Column (1) 


















































































































Sample size 407 407 407 









Table 13: The effect of hedging on firm value at different levels of jet fuel price volatility 
This table reports the coefficients estimated from Eq. (15): ∆LnQi,y = α + β1 ∗ ∆PerHedg 
XLowVol + β2 ∗∆PerHedg XHighVol + β3–16(Control Variablesi,y) + ei,y where ∆LnQi,y is the 
change in the natural logarithm of Tobin's Q for airline i in year y; ∆PerHedgXLowVol is the 
change in the product of the percentage of next year's jet fuel requirements hedged and the low 
jet fuel price volatility year dummy (LowVol); ∆PerHedgXHighVol is the change in percentage 
of next year's jet fuel requirements hedged (∆PerHedg) multiplied by high jet fuel price 
volatility year dummy (HighVol). ∆Control Variables is the first difference of the other firm 
control variables used in Eq. (8). Column 1 uses an OLS model with robust standard errors. In 
Columns 2, we use an FGLS model to control for heteroskedasticity. Column 3 uses a firm 
fixed effects model. The parentheses below the coefficients report the p-value for each 
coefficient. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, 
respectively.  
 Column (1) 












































































































Sample size 370 370 370 
Adj. R2 0.2942 0.2947 0.2611 
F-statistic 10.61*** 
(0.000) 
10.64*** 
(0.000) 
3.51*** 
(0.000) 
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